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It i s  now genera,lly accepted both i n  the literatur'e and in 
policy discuss ions th"t the authorities should a1m .. t achieving the 
inter'"al .,ac,'oeconomic target of "on-,inflationary high--employment 
growth , In ,'eali ty, how high th"t g,'ol.th ,'"te is wi 11 critically 
depend on severai structural constraints: the attl tudes of employers 
and worker's in the wage a.nd pr·ice .. �sel:tit19 proces s ,  the degl"cQ of 
labour' .,ob i l i ty , and the size of the capital stock , It seems to be the 
case, however, that gover'ments a l so cat'e about the ex ter'nal accounts 
and that they ofte,., invoke the exi stence of external const,'aints when 
designing macroeconomi c  pol ic ies , In "pite of this gene,'alized 
practice, i.t is not alway s c learly under-stooel why should Uw,'e b" 
external targets , and wha.t i s  the correct notion of the (�xter·na.l 
constr'b1.int . 
The pu,'pose of this pape,' i s  twofold , On the one hand, to 
ana.lise to Whc:lt extUrlt and under wha.t condit ions the pursuit of 
exte,',.,al targets i s  justifiable f,'om a conceptual point of view, and 
how U",.e ta"'9� ts rel .. te to the u l t imate exter'nal con.tr'ainl of the 
economy . On the other' hand, to examine the macroeconomic performance 
"nd policy experience in the Spanbh ecortomy to f.ind out: ( i )  how 
",acroeconomi. c pol i c ie s  have been irtfluenced in the past by the 
evolu tIon of the "x ter'nal account.; ( i i )  wheth .. r the economy is 
curr-ently following a path consi stent with meeting the external 
constt'aint; ( iii)  whctt CUrT(mt account dl1d real-exchange n:l.te tar9l�ts 
should the economy ai.m at in the future to continue to satisfy the 
external constraint; and finally (iv) what ma�ro policiQS SQ��m most 
appropiate for this purpose , 
In onle,' to add"cs s  these i s sues, the paper' i s  organised as 
fol lows: Section 2. star·ts . rev iewing the recunt per'for'mance of the 
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Spanish economy by focussing on the specific episodes where balance of 
payments probl","s have led to significant changes in macro policies, 
Section 3 defines the exte.-... al const,'aint and ,'elates it to the 
concepts of solvency and deficit sustainabi Ii ty, Sections 4 and 5 
empir'ically test if the Spanish econon,y is following a path consistent 
",ith the ful fil,""nt of lhe external cons traint, Section 6 prov ides 
policy guidelines to facilitate the task of ensuring that the futu,'e 
evolution of lhe Spdni.h baldnce of payments and the real exchange 
rate continue to satisfy both the internal and the external 
conslr°aint. ThQ final section summarises the conclusions. 
2, �ACROECON9MIC _ PERFORMANCE AND POLICIES ,IN SPAIN 
The pu.'pose of this section is to highlight the most 
salient facts in the evolution of Spani sh exLernal aecounts and to 
verify to what �xtOrlt macroeconomic policy has been responsive to this 
evoll.it-ion
1
, For this purpose, .able 1 contains a set of useful 
indicator's of the .inter'nal and exte.'n"l Spanish macroeconomic 
perfor ..  nce and macro policies dudng the last two decades, while 
Table 2 give. a more detailed breakdown of the bala"c .. of payments, 
After having expf!rienced a long p(�riod of Y'apid 
high,·e,"ploym<!nt growth with a nearly balanced cur,'""t account .. nd a 
substantial accummulation of for-eign ,-ese,'ves between 1.959 and 1973, 
l;h" economy ente,'ed into a st"gflation",ry period following the first 
oil pdce shock, This shock coincided with the end of General Franco's 
regime ",nd with the introduction of the political par'ty system, 
Between 1974 to 1984, the count"y suffered a deep, long and seve,'e 
economic crisis. Three !nain reasons underlay this crisis: i) the 
delayed response to the initial negative i",pact of the shock, so as to 
avoid political and social conf,'ontations, augmented by a significant 
world recession; ii) a substantial degree of real wage rigidity in the 
face of a severe terms of t.'ade loss; and iii) the Qxistel1ce of 
various othe,' labour market inflexibi li ties which in conjuction with 
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SPANISH MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND POLICY: 1969·1989 Table 1 
(Period averages unless stated the contrary, in percent) 
1969-73 1974-77 1978-79 1980�2 1983�5 1986�9 
MACRO-PERF�CE 
.) EXTERNAL 
Current Account (a) 0.6 -3.1 0.9 -2.6 0.4 -'l.7 
Nanin.ll exchangE! Rate (b) IS5.6 179.3 141.1 132.7 101.9 101.5 
Real Exchange Rate (e) 90.2 102.1 112.0 111.0 9S.0 113.3 
Terms of Trade (d) 116.6 105.5 114.5 94.1 90.0 109.3 
forelgn Reserves (e) 8.4 4.5 6.3 4.1 S.S 9.8 
(Net of Gold) 
Net Forelgn Oebt (e) -2.6 8.0 3.1 12.0 11.5 -1.1 
(Gross Debt minus foreign Reserves) 
b) INTERNAL 
Inflation (CPll 1.4 IS.4 IS.O IS. I 10.5 6.5 
Real Growth (COP) 6.7 3.0 0.6 0.7 2.0 4.7 
Unemployment Rate 1.6 4.2 S.3 12.8 20.1 IS.S 
AACRO-POLICY 
Total liquid Assets (f) 21. 1 19.7 19.3 17 .4 15.0 12.6 
Budget Balance (a) 0.4 -'l.2 -1.1 -4.0 -5.S -3.6 
Real Unit labour Costs (f) 0.0 0.8 0.3 -'l.S -3.0 -1.3 
Notes: 
a) As a percentage of GOP. 
b) Effective Nominal Exchange Rate vis-a-vis developed countries (Index 19S5 c lOO). 
e) Real effective exchange rate vis-a-vis developed countries using CPI's (Index 1985 : 100). 
d) Index. 
e) As a percentage of GOP. End of period. 
f) Growth rate. 
Sources: Banco de Espana and European Commission. 
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COMPONENTS OF THE SPANISH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Period averages, percent of GDP) 
1969-73 1914-17 1918-19 1980-82 
Exports 6.9 8.1 9.2 10.8 
iqlorts 11.6 14.9 12.0 16.3 
Tnde Balance -4.1 �.8 -2.8 -5.5 
SeN1ce Balance 3.6 2.S 2.S 2.1 
Net Transfer-s 1.7 1.2 1.0 0.8 
CUrrent Account 0.6 -3. 1 0.9 -2.6 
Net long-tenm capital 1.5 2.4 1.8 2.2 
Basic Balance 2.1 -0.1 2.1 -0.4 
Net short-tenm capital 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 
Change in Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 2.0 -0.2 2.0 -0.8 
Source: Seerelaria de Estado de Comercio. 
Table 2 
1983-aS 198�9 
13.9 12.0 
11.3 16.9 
-3.4 -4.9 
3.0 3.3 
0.8 1.0 
0.4 -0.6 
0.8 2.5 
1.2 1.9 
0.2 0.6 
1.1 2.4 
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the previous ractors contributed to a sharp decline irl industrial 
<!mplayment by av<!r 20 per c""t dur' ,n9 the second h .. I F of the 
seventies , S i nce 1985 however the courltr'y has under90ne a very str'an9 
,'ecavery which has b""n foste,'ed both by adequate domestic palici<!s. 
world r'ecaver'y, and last -but not l .... st-.. by the opportunities and 
expectations cY'Qdted by Spain's accession to Lhe Europt.�em Economic 
Commun ity . 
Both Table. fu"th,,,,, d i s tin9u i s h  amal19 sub-per'iads based all 
Lhe external performance of the economy . In this r'ega.rd, i t  can be 
observed that after' the fon:!ign exchange r-eser'ves accunlloulation and 
sa.tisfactory current account pey'foy'manca of Lhe begirming uF the 
seventie., the f i r'st o i l  shock led dllrin9 1974--77 to cur'r'ent account 
clefic i ts, resel"-ve los seas, and nominal excha.nge Y"d.te d(�pr�ec (at ion 
pressur'es in the face of a real appreciation of the ppseta , The 
subs tant ial increase in m�t external d(-!bt by 10 . 6  percenldt39 points of 
GOP between 1973 and 1977, and the da"ger of a" unstoppable balarlce of 
p .. yments cri s is prompted lhe "conomic authori lies of the newly e lee ted 
Democratic center Party Government to implement a 15% dE.waluatJon of 
the pes"ta 1n Ju l y ,  1917 l09"ther with a series of monel .. " y  policy 
measur'es aimed at restraining demand gr·owth. and a social agreement on 
wage mod"H'ation known as the Moncloa Pact. As a result, UHH"Q was a 
s igni ficant impr'ovement in the current account balance, a 
replt�nishmetlt of foreign exchange reserves,  and a drop in net. exter'nal 
debt i.n 1978-,79 . On the i nte,-"al s ide , althou9h the ti9htenin9 of 
monetary policy was not accompanied by a tightening of fi scal policy, 
there was neverthe l"ss a s i.9nifi<;ant reduction i n  the 9rowth r'ate and 
a reversal of the acceleratin9 inflation trend of the prev ious period , 
However', the insufficient de9r'ee 
moeler'aUon combined with Lhe persi stence of 
d i s tor'siol1s in .  labour' markets produced, once 
of wag(� and del11and 
many rigidi ties . and 
the effects of the 
nominal devaluation 
defici t s ,  a drop in 
disd.ppearad, a rl9W series 
foreign exchange reserves, 
of cur'r'(·mt account 
and a si9"ificant 
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build--up of net extern",l d.,bt, which increased by 8 , 3  p,p , of Gnp 
bet"""," 1979 cl"d 198 2 ,  As a result, ",hun the Sociali.t Pa,'ty took 
office by the end of 1982,  there was again the danger' of a balance of 
payments crisis. To avoid a cri s i s ,  the n�w economic authorities 
en.ba,"ked on a 10'1'. devaluation of the peseta in December, 1982 and 
impl(!merltp.d a furth�r li<.lht"rling of mOrll!ta,'y -rIOt fiscal- policy , 
These measu"es were accompanied by a set of structural supply-.. side 
refor'llls (indusb'i.al res Lrue turing , ener'l�Y sav ings and labour market 
flexibili.ty policies) designed to improve the production potential of 
the economy over the mad ium··�ter·m. 
Following this policy shift and helped also by a wor-lwide 
economic recovery I there was in 1983-85 a substantlal improvemt,mt in 
the current account balcmce, a r�covery of for'eigl'l e)(chan9(� reSCl!I"ves 
.. nd a slight reduction in nat "x ter'nal debt, Moreov"r, the significart  
moder-aUon of unit l",bour' costs r-elativ" to p,-evious pedods allow.,d 
aggregate supply to expand thus helping achieve a higher growth rate 
and a further' r .. duction of inflation , 
It was precisely to .... rds the be<.linning of 1985 th .. t the 
Spanish economy started the vigorous recovery which ntarked its 
entrance into the EEC in the following year, ",nd which has also led to 
a str'ong output g,"owth rate and, until 1988 , to a gradual disinflation 
process, However, coincid ing with the entry of Spain to the EEC the,'., 
has also been a - marked shift towards a continous widening of the 
cur,'"nt account deficit , which has gone fr'om a sur'plus of 1 .  7'1'. of GOP 
in 1985 to a deficit of 3 , 0'1'. in 1989,  and to an expected d .. fici t of 
3 ,  S'I'. 'in 19902 , 
Nonetheless , ther'e is an impo,'t",nt differ'ence between the 
present episode and the other two discus."d above, in spite of .. 11 of 
them being ch .. r'acterised by per'si,tent current account deficits , While 
in the previous situations thu('e was a loss of foreign reservesl a 
signi ficant external debt build-up , and nominal depreciati.on pressur'es 
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in  the peseta mar'ket, in  the pr'esent s ituOltion there has been a major' 
dccUinmu ldtion of foreign reserves,  do switch fr'om a ntit debtor l:o a net 
credi tor position, Clnd an appr'eciating p(�seta in both nominal and real 
tel'IIlS . In other wor'ds,  lhe roceut widening curront account deficit has 
been more thOln financed by cOlpital flows and , spec ifically,  by net 
foreign inve�tn,ent . 
Moreover', whi le in  the two pr'evious epi sode s ,  which pl.aced 
the economy near a balance of payment cr'i s i s  s i tuation, the current 
account deficit came fr'om large reductions in total domestic saving in 
lhe pr'esence uf dC:!ci"easlfl9 or' slagnoult inv�st:mt:!r1t, in the pr'eSetlt 
epi sode the current account deficit i s  coming fr'om an impress ive 
increase in total domestic inves tment that canrlot be fu lly  financed by 
domestic SOlving , Indeed , as shown in Figure 1 ,  i n  the fir'st episode 
( 1974-17) lhe savi,'g and inves t",ent rates c"me de,,"n respectiv�ly by 
3 , 8  and 5 , 7  p , p ,  of G[)P, In the second per'iod ( 1 980-.. 82), the s .. vings 
,'dte I..:<",me down by 2 . 1  p . p .  whi le lhe irlves tm�mt r'ate d(!c l ined by 3 . 3 .  
p ,  p ,  ],n contrOlst,  i .. the curr'ent per'iod ( 1986-·89) the saving r'ate has 
\lone up by 1 . 0  p , p, whi l e  the inves tm<lnt ,'ate has gone up by an 
impressive 5 . 6  p . p .  
In spite of al l the above, there i s  sti  I I  a lot of 
uncer'tainty a.nd d i s.a9n�ement in Spain l'lowddays r'etja.rd ing the ex lent to 
which the curTent externa.l s ituation is sustai.nable or not . 
Speci fical l y ,  if pres"" t trends continu .. wi 11 cur'r,,,,,t account d"fici ts 
beco",e too large to b" fin .. nced by stable di.rect investment flows, 
thus leading to .. n e.plosion of e.ternal debt in the absence of 
corrective pol i.cy "",asures? Or, on the contr .. ry , could i t  be the case 
that the Spanish economy i.  Mt just solvtmt but dynamica l ly 
inefficient, and therefore that i t  could run even larger current 
account defici ts to take advant"\le of its present net creditor 
positon? Th"se issu�s w i l l  be addr'esed later on the paper,  
" 
" 
" 
" 
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" 
" 
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11 .. " " " " " " 
s = Total Saving 
, 
= Total Investment 
Source: National Accounts 
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lhis section has pl"ovided some casual evidence in support 
uf the hypoth",is lhe\t the major policy changes which occu,.,."d in 
Spain dur'ing the last twenty years have be,,,, tr'iggeY'ed by what was 
,'"g''' cl<,d e\S a high ly un f<IVou,'able evo lu tion of the ex ternal accounts, 
In the following section we try to ascertain what i.s the natur'" of the 
external constraint .  
As stated in the intr'ocluc:tion, while the,"e is a cleay· 
mnaning aLtached to internal targC:!ts and constrainl:s fi"()m a 
macr·o�c.:onomic point of view , there 
\;he popu lar d .. fini tions 
is a lot more confusion and 
of what const;itu Lt�S external a .. bigu; ty 
targets 
in 
and constrodnts. For instance, standard nldcroecol'lomic 
lIC;!xtel"nal balance" as a si ttja,'t·ion where lQX lbooks have b0.l:!n dC:!fining 
the b .. lance of pay .. ents 
lhe\t while 
is zero , At the s ...... ti.me, they h .. "" also 
this balance can be autolll .. tically and 
continuously maintedned under flexible exchan9(� rates, it requi.r·es of 
other policy instruments under fixed exchangQ r'ates . 
I t  is now w) de ly r'ecogn,i,z(1d J hOWe\HU', that a sens ible 
ir>ter'py·.,tation of exteY'"al balance should center primarily around the 
curr'ent account balance , which is the d{�ter'lHintlnt of the net tlsset 
accumulation prOC(�S5 by the economy , Moreover, for a 9.!-�n current 
account balance, the role played by exchange rate policy is just left 
to influence the distribution of n"t aSS<lt accummulation betw'-"ln the 
private and the publ ie sector , 
Indeed , the external constr'aint of the econolllY should be 
urlder'slood in a long-t'un sense. Specifically� ·if a cQunt.:I"Y runs a 
trade balance deficit in the p resent i t  wil.l accumulate net external 
liabilities that wi 1 1  ncod to be paid for in the future . Thus, in the 
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future there will be an equilibrium situation where the country runs a 
trade balance surplus which is just enough to service the nut external 
debt; namely , the long�run current account balance will be zero. 
Consequently , an economy running a series of trade balance 
deficits in the present must inevitably be ready to run trade balance 
sur'pluses in the future that allow servicing the current level of 
exterrlal debt; 1. e .  that preserve its solvency. If the present value 
of future expected trade surpluses is riot large enough, the economy 
wi 11 not be able to ful ly service its net debt and therefore wi 11 
become insolvent . If, on the contrary , the present value of future 
expected trade surpluses is too large, the economy wi 11 be in a 
situation of dynamic inefficiency since it will not fully exploit its 
intertemporal consumption possibilities. Accordingly,  the path of the 
currerlt account balance will be sustainable if it is consist"rlt with 
the long-run external solvency constraint. 
Summarising , in a long-run equilibrium situation the 
economy will satisfy the condition that the present value of its 
spend ing -on both domestic and foreign goods- plus the value of its 
net external debt be equal to the present value of domestic income . 
Fu,·thermore , this constraint will apply regard less of the evolution of 
the overall balance of payments and of the specific exchange rate 
policy followed by the authorities . 
It must be pointed out, however, that although the external 
constraint is a long-run one -i . e. the long-run cur"ent account must 
ba1ance- there may be reasons why govements also worry about the 
shorter-run evolution of the current account. As explained in Vina1s 
(1986 ) ,  in a Wa1rasian world with fully flexible prices and wages, no 
distortions , no uncertainty , and perfect access to international 
financial markets, the long-run external constraint will be the only 
one facing the economy . In such a case the path of the current account 
and foreign debt levels would be socially and privately optimal and 
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th .. policymake,'. would not f .... l the n .. ed to .. xpr' .. s. cone .. r'n about 
them, Unfortunatoly this is not the world we live in, With ",arkets 
ridd .. n by in,perf .. ction. and di.sto"tions, the authorities may have have 
savor'al r'Hasons to be concel"rlc�d about the shor't-r'un behaviour' of the 
cur't"ent account . Prominent among these y'eaSol',s ar'Q the following: i) 
Sticky prices and wa9as� whe."eby a worsening of the cur',"p.nt account is 
inte"pr'eted as a leakage in demand that boosts the foreign economy and 
slow5 down dome s lic growth, when output is del1lcmd dater'mined; ii) 
Diver-g .. nce between private and social costs of borrowing and lending 
abr'oad which may motivate restrictions on capital inflows and 
outflows, r,.,ducing the mobility of c .. pit .. l and c'Jr'respondi.ngly 
el"vating the curr'''nt account as a policy goal (soe A"tis dnd Bdyoumi 
(1990»; iii) Uncer'tainty about futur'.. flex ibi Ii ty to cO'Tect paths 
that, while satisfying 10rlg-n", solv.Hley , are excessively profligate 
today and will imply ."vere constr'aints in the future whi.ch may be 
wise to avoid; iv) Influence of the current account on the atti tude of 
financial mark(�ts, whe,"'eby a d'�terior'ation in the curr'ent account 
affec ts market sentinfent with the corresponding speculative attacks  
against the domestic curr'ency in a world of fixed exchClllge rates and 
causes "xcess,ive short:,-,'un voldtility of the rlaminal and rnal excharlge 
rate. when they ar'., flexi.ble; v) Influence of the cur'r,.,nt account and 
exten,al debt p«lhs on the cost of borTowing , whereby an exte,'nality 
is ililposed on the country a� a whole and on future borr'owers by the 
", .. r-gi"al borTowe,'; vi) Irrevers iblity arguments  by which once export 
markets at"e lost they ar'e not easily regained; and finally vii) 
Protectionist thr'ea ts t.hat may emerge fr'om political pressu,' ... after 
an extended pet-iod of substanti.al cur,'el1t account deficits ,  
As a result , the authori ties should always' remain vigilarlt 
that the net external debt of the countr'y does not gr'ow beyond its 
ability to pay, while in the Cdse of economies suffering f,'om one or 
several of the imperfections and distor'tions iust mentioned above they 
",ay, also warlt to set '-gem,,'ally upper- limi ts to the stock of the net 
external debt at any given point of time , 
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fa for'maliz.e th(�se id(�as, i t  is convenil!rlt to write the 
balance of paym"mts of an open economy as: 
(1) 
wher'e CA, CAP and LlR are respectively the cun'ent and c"pital 
account balances, and the change in o'Fficial forG:ign (�xchangQ r·e�er·v(-�s. 
Each of the.e variables is defined in domestic cur'r'ency as: 
(2 .) 
( 3 )  
where p and pl! eire respectively the domestic "nd foreign price levels, 
e the nomi",.1 e x(;hange rate, M and X the impoy't arid expoy't vo1um(,s of 
goods c\nd services, IN not total foreign investment, TR tr'ansfers, and 
B* the end of period stock of net e xter'nal debt valur"d in for'eig" 
CUt/Taney . 
Using identities (2) and ( 3 ) ,  the bOllance of pOlyn'Nlts 
identity ( 1) can be rewritten as: 
p* 
t 
e
t 
M + t i')(-t-l 
e
t B
lf
t_1 
+ e t Blf' t .. -l 
- Pt 
X
t 
+ IN + 
t 
e
t 
B'l! + 
t 
TR 
t (4) 
, I v V 
Outflows Inflows 
According to (4), lhe 'eco'll>my obtains in "ach period a 
given amount of resources which are: used to nleet its external payments 
obligations, Sped ficaUy, in each period the economy needs to f inanee 
imports of goods and services, and inter'est payments and p.-i. nci pal 
r'"payment on the net ex ter'nal debt with the revenues provided by 
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exports of goods and serv ices, transfers, net foreign investment and 
new ext .. ,'nal debt. 
In thi s ,'egard , we wi sh tt> e",phasize that an impo,'tant 
d i stinction might be made betw""n those ",ovements of net ax ternal 
l i  ... b i l ities assoc iated wi.th total investment (dir'ect ,  portfo l i o ,  real 
".late) whi�h do not nec<! •• ari ly have to be r'epaid in the event of a 
financ ial cri s i sl and movements which ar'e proper debt assets or 
l iabi l i ties . Under this lalter h<>ad ing we prer"r to inc lude all assets 
or l iabilities bear'ing DIn interest-paym,mt obl.i.gation, which is the 
truly relevant definition of "net external debt" in a country l ike 
Spairl, where steady ror'eign investmerlt plays' a pl"omimmt r'ole in the 
evolution of the "xte,'nal accounts ( .ne Cooper and Sachs ( 1985». We 
thus define the :fundamental" ". account balance. of the economy (Zt) as 
lhe sum of the primary curr'e.,t account baldnce ,md the ",.t investments 
balDln,'e excluding the latter from the definition of debt: 
, 
Z
t -
CA
t + 
ilf et Blf + IN t-1 t- 1 t 
or 
( 4 ' )  
(4") 
Using an appr'oximate version of (4"),  l inear'ized Clrourld a 
steady s tate s i tuation, wh .. ,.-e inter'".t r'«te padty i s  fulfiUnd, and 
where the foreign interest rate, domesti.c reDll output g,'owth and 
inflation clre constant, the fol lowing s tand«rd debt «ccumulation 
equation can be obtall,ad: 
�, _. (r*-·n)/l+n (5)  
wher'e bll' and z are, respectively , the net external d .. bt  a.,d the 
IIfundamental "account balance as a percent of GOP J ,.)f the r'aal Foreign 
interest rDlte, and n the domestic trend GOP real growth rate,  
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As pointed out by Cohen ( 1985), whe" the real inte"est rate 
on the d"bt i s  sma l ler than tht! domestic growlh ,· .. t" (iI.<O) any 
stable path of the "fundamental " account balance i s  consistent with a 
stable external debt/GOP "atio, .. nd a country is solvllnt no matter how 
large i s  its initial net external debt . In this case, wh"" tr'y ing to 
integ"ate (5) forward it tUl"ns out that the pres""t value of future 
"fundamental" account sur·pluses i s  effectively infinity , no ma.tter' how 
sma l l  they are . 
However, i f  the i"terest r'ate i s  high.,..' than than the r·.,te 
of growth of the economy (iI.>O) expression (5) can be int"'lrat0d 
forward , obtaini"g : 
-1 
P �, (1 + iI.) (6) 
assumi"g that 1. N 1m p E bl(- =, 0; i . .. .  the tra"sversality condition hold s .  t t+N N--)u) 
The requirel1Hmt for thi s  condition i s  obvious ly wQak(�r than that 
whe"eby blft should be stable,  as w i l l  be seen subsequently . 
Equation (6)  represents the equ i l i brium intertemporal 
budget constraint of an open economy when iI.>O . It tel l s  us th"t the 
prese"t level of debt as a proportion of GDP n,ust be equal to the 
present value uf the ufurlddmental" account surpluses . Thi s  s i  tuation 
i s  in contr'ast to that wher'c i\.<O, where as we m0.ntioned about! a 
debtor country need only stab i l  ize its rat i., Zt without hav 109 to 
WO'TY about obtaining future su,·pluses . 
It i s  possible never·theless to stabi l i ze the level of net 
exte,'nal debt in (6) around a chosan s teady"'·state value (blf) -both in 
cases wher'e the interest r .. te i s  higher' and lower' than the growth ,· .. te 
(iI.> 0)- by selecting a " funda",e"tal" balance target (z) so that < 
r* - n z = -"--- blf 1 + n (7) 
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Cond i tion ( 7 ) , which pf'oves very stY'ong , emphas i ses that 
thQre is a close r'ela.tionship betwc(m Lhe economy 1 s external 
indebted,'''!'' and the "fundamental" balance that must be met 01'1 average 
in onJor to make the f'l�al I"usource lr'a.nsfer that is requir(�d to cope 
with the financial burden derived from such indebtedness ,  The level of 
z which sati.fi.Gs this condi tion i s  generally termed the "sustainable" 
lellel , 
l'he IIsteady�· -stbl.tell versi.on of the tY'UQ i nter'tempof'a} budget 
conslra lnt of th" economy in (7) is also useful to explain several 
popul"r nd,sconceptions about th" nature of the exteY'nal cOl'lstY'"int 
often used in policy d i scuss ions, 
01'1 the one h"",d , whil ." it i s  tY'ue in a loose sense that th" 
evolution of foreign variables ,-prices , output and inter'e.t rates­
influences domestic.: economic  perforlllanc(� this i s  not really til 
constraint, .. lthough it does aff<let the extornal constraint , Nam"ly, 
if we think of th" "fundamental" balance as bei.ng m.drlly deteY'mi.ned, 
amung other variables ,  by th" evolution of domestic (n)  and foreign 
3 
growth (nlf>, and th" Y'ed ax chang" Y'ate (6) (z",z ( n , ,,If, 6);z2>0,zl , z3<O) 
thon a perman�nt drop in foreigrl growth ti9h Lt�ns l:he (:ons Lraint, for a 
giv",! npt exteY'nal d .. bt , by low"ring z, thus requ iY' ing a r"al 
depr"c iation to continue sathfying th" ext, ... nal contraint; Le, For z 
to remain the same , S imilarly , a permanent increase in the forei.gn 
real interest rate increases the Fundamental balance surplus that a 
deblo," COUl'ltt .. y must run, on average,  to satisfy the exteY'nal 
constraint , fiowever, a neutral change i n  the foreign pric" 1"v<>1 will 
not affect the exter'nal constraint since the equilibrium Y'eal exchange 
rate remains unchanged . 
On the othey' hand , although i t  i s  cleay' that irl a world of 
complete capital in,nobility no defi c i t  or surplus i s  sustainable, i t  
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i. often claimed that the influence of external con.traint. on the 
doone.tic economy become. greater a. the country increa.e. it. degree 
of trade and financial openne.. vis-a--vi. the rest of the world, 
However, this is not necessarily '0 becau.e while it i. certainly the 
ca.e that a. trade openness increase. the ela.tici ties of the current 
account balance relative to output and competitiveness also increa.e., 
it is also true that better financial integration allow. deficit 
countries to bor'row inter'nationally without exerting a. much upward 
pressure on domestic interest rates. 
Finally, it is frequently heard that a credible commi ttment 
to follow a stable exchange rate policy -like belonging to the 
European Monetary System (EMS)- increases the weight of exterl1al 
constraints on the dome.tic economy since the authorities are no 
longer able to accommodate domestic price increases through nominal 
exchange rage depreciation., thus fostering policies oriented to .... rd. 
price stability, In this regard, while it is certainly the cas" that 
-under cer'tain conditions- a credible commiltment to exchange rate 
stability .. la EMS will help achieve price stability, this will be 
neutral in the .ense of not affecting any of the underlying real 
variables -output growth, the real exchange rate, the real interest 
rate- which appear in (7} as the onain deter'minants of the long-run 
"external constraint,,4, Therefore, while EMS-type arrangements 
constraint the steady-.tate behavior of nominal variables, they do not 
necessarily affect the steady-state intertemporal budget constraint of 
the economy, 
After this brief analysis of the nature of the external 
constraint of an open economy, we test in the next two .ection. 
whether the external performance of the Spanish economy i. con.i.tent 
with the .olvency and dynamic efficiency principles, 
4, TESTING FOR SOLVENCY AND DYNAMIC INEFFICENCY 
As shown in expression (6) of section 2 ,  which expresses 
the external constraint in terms of the expected "fundamental" account 
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balcmce. an economy is solvent if th(,� tr'ansver'sality conditiol'l 
gUClr'Cmte:i ng 
( , t'�N hmp 
N·· ·}m 
the non-explos iveness of 
[t b
M =. 0 ) i s  satisfied, In t+N 
external d(�bt 
this section we 
to GOP 
descr'ibe 
a.lt,�nlali\le econolTll�tr'i(: tp.sts for' solv{mcy and dynamic ineffichmcy 
which allhou\lh originating in lh" govn"m<>nt budgQt <:ons\.rairlt 
J.i.ter'atur'" can be readily adapted to the p,"ese,'.t context, 
These t"sts al"" d""ived fr'om the methodology ",..'oposed by 
Hamilton "rid Flavin ( 1986) "rid Tr<lhan .. nd Walsh ( 1988), Assuming th"t 
t+N the factor p E b* t+N t 
(0""'0) i s  non· .. ·stochastic and differ,,,,,t from zero, 
which r'''pr'esel'lts the alten.at ive hypothesis to (6), the expY'e s s i on 
N N i b* - p E b* + l: p Et Zt-l"i t t UN i",1 
may be wri lbm as: 
( 1+71.) t 
N i bM - a -+ E p E Zt+i t 0 i�l t 
rhus lhe solvency constr .. int holds if "0 .. ,0, 
fl"'AUton «rid Fl .. vin pY'op,,"e h"" tests, First, 
(8) 
(9) 
fo \.". t wheUm,' "0.=0, 
assuming a univariate 
process for' 2 t' the stationarity of the discoun
ted sum of futur'., 
surpluses is test.'d ( s taUonarity of the undiscounted sUI"plus being 
suffici<!"t foY' the stationarity of lhe slim of expected discounted 
su"pluses if p<l), Then, if this sum i. stationary, b*t will be 
stationary if .. ,'ld only if aO,,=a. The s�cond t",t suggests es timating 
equation (9) directly, making differ'ent assumption. about tlw 
informati.on set underly.tng Lhe fonuation of expectations abuut future 
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surpluses , If it is as sumed that th"se e x p"ctau.ons are based on past 
values of su"pluses .. nd d"bt, by laking 'ii' av"r''''�l'' value of iI., (9) 
can be ,'eplaced by: 
( 10 )  
whel"e e t iS a n  e rr'Or' tp.tlll that inc l u d e s  the potential variabi 1 i. ty 
of interest rate s and possible meaSUf'elllEml erTor 's . lhe tf!st i.nvolv{�s 
Gxa.mining the $l:atistical significance of aO' 
Sever'al re..strictiv(! assumptions underlle Lho cons tnlction 
of th"se tests, F i ,'st , it is as sumed that facto,' iI., which i s  a " •• al 
interest ('ate 1�:,'!3s the "'dote of growLh in r'(�al tenllS of GOP, is 
non-.. stochasti,c -- a very s trol'I9 a.�lsumption , Second , i.t is assunwd that 
violations uf the bOtTOwing constraint are 01.130 !'lorl'-stochastic , i.e. 
ao( 1+iI.)
t , lhird, with ,'egard to the first h'st described above , 
cointeg,'aUon th(wl"y ( see Engl e  and Grange,' ( 1987» states that the 
non"-stationari ty of b\ and Zt in 
suffici(�nt condi tion for a
O
:·::O. 
( 9 )  is nGithar do neces�dry not" a 
poss ibil i ty that Zt ,md 
above test may lack power ,  
4 , 2 ,  1.I:!JLW.ick,!ill!,,.Tes.1. 
h* t dr-a 
In otht-!r wor'ds I 
5 cointegr'ab!d "[n $uch ca�e , Lho 
In a ,'"cent pape,' Wickens ( 1 989) suggests t ... king the.· 
possibilily of cointcgY"a.tion into consid(�ration by assumi.ng thdt b* t 
and Zt are gene,'ated by the joint. s tochastic process 
where x '=.{b* I t t  z) and t Ut i
.s a stationary 
( 1 1  ) 
di stur"bbmc(:! " 
E'quaUon ( 1 1 )  is derived fr'om the systmn of two equations for'l1Ied by 
the debt accumu lation equation (5) and 
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(12) 
Fquation (12) may be i"terpreted as an automatic or 
discretional policy rule which includ(�s possible dttempts by the 
autho,·ities to increase. the surplus (reduce the deficit) when the 
propo,-ti.m of debt in ,-.,lati"" to GOP increases (a;>0)6 _ The,-efo"e, 
(11) may be wr·j t ten as 
[I\�*tl = [.nl + [i\.-a; ,,(11'11)] [ultt_1] + [.et 1 
l\Zt Tlj a_ II Zt -1 "t 
(13 ) 
Solvi.ng (1.3) backwar-ds yields 
where el 1 
N .. 1 No .. 1 N N 
.. lim ei p [(HO) 
Nfi"')QI 
xt 
� 1: 
(HO) ill + 
1: 
(HO) i E U t loN .  _i](14) i",O io.·O t 
.- (1,0) .. nd e' 1 X :.: b)f t t 
Note that (14) g,meralises Hamilton and Flavin's test, 
allowing for the sum of the thr'ce componmlts to be zo ... o - oven though 
'Some of them ma.y not b{� nu 11 - prov ided they offset each other. 
Fur-lher, by e.lablishir'g a stochastic process Pur ut ' til .. 
possibi Ii ty that devi.atiuns wHh respect to the bor-rowing con.lraint 
are stochastic is allowed for. 
For' .. straightforwa,'(j analysis of the implications of (13), 
lot us assUine fir"st l:hd.l: Zt' is a no'n--stationary process, and, for 
illustation pur'poses, that it is gover-ned by the following the IMA(1) 
process 
• 
t·-1 (15) 
- 22 -
This impl ies that i.n ( 17) , a 
sufficient cond it ion for Lhe � x i s tence of the fir'�t tt.IJO tenDS of Lhe 
right s ide of ( 1 4 )  is that UI(� char'acter i stic f'Oots of the matr' i x  
(I.e), n. ( i .�1 , 2) should be 
1 
such that I n.l<p. 
1 
In the 
at hand , 
y i elds 
these roots a.re (Hi\,) e\nd 1 .  Thu s ,  d iagona l i s in�� 
He 
Jl�i\, - 1 1
= 
[1 1 1 [Hi\, 0 ] [ 1 -·1 /i\, 1 
l 0 1 0 i\, 0 1 0 IIi\, 
Accor'<:lirlg ly I assuming l:hc\t i\.>O 
lim 91 [p(I+6}]N xt ._ 
N'-)m 
(i\,b* - Z )/i\, t t 
I i  .. 
N"")m 
i (He) 11 _ .. -n ( 1+1/i\,)1i\ 
l i  .. 
N->m 
t'.d.SG 
(I-Hl) 
( 16) 
( 17) 
( 1 8 )  
(19) 
'''he,-eafter, subs t i tuting ( 1 7 ) - ( 1 9 )  into (14) g i ves the soll"",l'Icy 
cond i t ion 
(20) 
i .  e .  e i ther an i n i t ia l  IIfundamental " account surplus that offsets the 
payments for invesblltHlt l(-!ss the IIfundaml-Hltalli a.ccoun t  balance tr\-�nd 
comp0l'lent i s  needed , or, i f  the i n i t ia l  positi.on is that of a m.�t 
cred i tor, the initi.a l  inves tl1l�nt i ncOIne should be suffici en\':. ly h igh to 
offset future IIfundal1lE:!nt�ll1 account defic i t s .  
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L.i kewi.se, 
may be derived "\8 
on the b",sis of (5) the p,'ocess governing bX t 
L\b* �. n/iI. , 'Y  p e t 1 t 
But since we already know frorn (5) that 
( 2 1 )  
(22) 
cornpar'is(On of (2.l) and (2.2) illlpli. •. , " th",t 'Y (( 1i·iI.) 0'", in other· 
words, Lhat the MA(1) la9 polynomial has a root at p. 
in gener'a.l 
since 
1he conclusion here 
to be 
is that if Zt is 1(1) with dr'ift, 
I(1) wilh drirt. Fur'ther, if '\ is 
order MA(m), 111>0, L\b\ wi II hav.' a 
the MA(m) lag polynomi.al must 
moving 
have a 
aVtU'clge of 
at p, For' 
(!xample, .tn our case m',:l �nd therefore the disturbance in (2.2) is 
whit .. noi. .. ,. Hence in this case Zt and b*t will be cointegratecl 
but to vef'ify th(� tr'c:U'lsv(,H"�ality conditi.ol'l, Zt must also satisfy th(� 
root condi.tion. Notice thd.t In the special case wht�re m::::O, i.e. '\ 
it s a whi te noi sa, Lho prev ious cond i tion c.:'\n not ho Id ctnd h(.mce the 
transversal i ty concl i t ion wi 1 1  not bE� vE�r'i fied (sep Troeha.f1 Ol.l'Id Wal. sh 
(1988» , 
Similar� impli.cations can be dr'awn for' other" processes 
followed by the II funddlfiental" balance � Zt' If I for instance I the 
p,'oc" .. followed by Zt is stationary, "rid there is stabil ization by 
the authorities, the pr'ocess governing Zt will be: 
Zt -= 11 
+ ex b" t- 1 + 
e
t - 'Y 1 
e
t_ .. 1 (23 ) 
in this case 13.=·- 1 ,  and the roots of ( He) are ( 1·1-il.-· ... ) and O .  If 
0<ex< 2 ( 1+iI.) , the charact�ristic roots of (I+e) ar'e less than 
-1 (l-til.)(=,p ) and, therefore, the solvency constr'aint is 
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automatically satisfied, i.e, the three terms of (14) tend to zer-o, 
Howcv(�r, wtHm UllH'e has been no �ta.bilisatiorl by the c:\uthor'ities, i.Q, 
a.=O, the characteY'istic r'oots of (HO) ar'e (l.+iI.) and 0 ,  In this 
ca.se I by a simi la.r a.r-gummlt to the 0119 used above, it 15 ed.sy to prove 
that the tr.lI1sver'Sali ty condition holds provid,·d that 
l>* "n/il. - 'I' p .  t 1 t (H) 
that is, b*t follows a silldla," process to (21.) except. th .. t b*t' 
like Zt is J(O) , Similar'ly, the r'oot conditiol'  has to be ver'Hied by 
the MA lag pol.yn, ",; .. l of et, 
A,ny of the previous conditions of th(� processes gE!rIeY'atil'l9 
b>+t and Zt are suffici,mt to ensure thd.t the transversd.lity 
condi.ti.on holds. However· a 9(�(;essd.ry and slIfficitmt condi.tiol'! that 
encompasses the pr'evious ones can be obtain d by noticing Lhd.t both in 
(21) and (24) Llb*t is stati.onar'y, Thus, if, for exampl.e, il'l (13) , 
it is assumed th .. t )I. .. and tl=�1, it follows that 
and 
-(n'�e ) t 
Llzt :. --il.n 
+ et - (l+iI.) e t,-l 
(25) 
(26) 
so that the roots of (HO) ar'e 0 and -1 which automatically satisfy 
the solvency constraint, while the MA(l) l"g polynomL.l in (26) 
satisfies the root condit i.on, Thus, testing for' statiortarity iro 
1\1>\ se, ,"s to prov i.de the kay te.t, compl"mented by the saine 
degree of integration irt Zt arid b*t' 
In spite of the generality of the arlalysis, as stated in 
lhe c<JlUm"nts on lhe ,nethod propo."d by Hamil ton ... nd Flav in, two 
problems ar'e left unresolved by this procedur'e, Fir'st, f .. ctor' iI. i.s 
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assul1\Gd to be positive since otherwisn p
N 
would tend to infinity 
instead of to zpro (see the derivation from (17)·"'(19». Since iI. 
rQpn�sents approxil1lCltely the difference b(�t\lJ(Hm Cl rl;lal interest r'ate 
and the rate of gt"owth of G[)P in real. terms, this assumption can be 
V (-l ry restrictive. Second, it is once mar's assumod thcit i\. is 
const .. nt. One possi.ble way of avoiding th<>se di.fficulties has recently 
boen p"opo,,,d by Wilcox (1989), whos" p"ocedurQ is diSCUSSOld in the 
followi.ng secti.on. 
The solution P"oposed by Wilcox consists of incot'·po,· .. ting 
i\. into the defini ti.on of the va.riablas I work ing in ter'ms of pres(�rlt 
discounted value instead of the original. PI"OPO,·ti.OllS. Indeed, in th" 
light of (5)  we can define the real discount factor as 
t-·l 
II p. 
i=O J 
(27) 
and multiplying both sides of (5)  by qt gives the discounted valu.·, 
of each variable back to period zero, i.e. 
(28) 
wher'e, by assuming that factor iI. is variable, dating is suitable. 
Representing by Ft the d i scount"d value of 
Xt the discounted value of Zt
' (28) can be rewritten as 
Solving (29) forwards yields 
b* and by 
t 
(29) 
N 
E 
j=l 
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Therefor'e, the transversality condition in discourlted t'�rrIlS, is 
lim E Ft+N .- 0 
N-><D t 
(30) 
AssLllIling once moy"e a pY'ocess simi.lar to (1.2), expY'assion 
(11) in discounted tems is gover-n<>d by the following joint pr'oell'S: 
(31 ) 
(14), 
SolvIng (31) backwards gi\les 
wi th lhe except iorl that the tt-H-Il  
Lhe condition ��quival(!r1t to 
N P is no lottyur Includ��d in 
that expre.sion, i , e , 
N··1 , 
E (H() \'+ 
i=,·O 
N···1 , 1 E (HO) 
i=O 
(32.) 
Note that her'., a sufficient condition for the fir'st two 
terms on 
roots 
Ill, 1<1, 1 , 
the right 
of the 
in which 
side of (32) to 
ma.tr·i x (1+0), 
case (32) tends 
exis t is that the ChcH'dctHri stic 
11, (i�.1,2), should s .. U sfy 1 
au tom .. ticaUy to zero. Since, 
on the basi. of (29), we know that Ft is an integr'ated process I(d) 
when Xt is I(d···1), a gener .. l condition for the solvency condition to 
hold is that 11",0 and Xt should be stationary wl.th a unit root in 
its moving aver'age; or, in other words, r t should be a stationary 
process with mean zero. The usual unit root tests dore the bdSis ror 
this test, per'forRled directly on F t' 
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In short, we con si dey' that the t<' st usin g the di sc oun ted 
val u e of t he vari ables is  t he bQ� t  mean s of exa minIn g t he verifi c ation 
of the so l vene y or' tran sver sal i ty c on d  i. ti. or! . Howe ver � f or the sak e of 
c om ple ten ess I we wi.ll u se all L he ver s i on s  pY'O posed of the s o 1 vene y 
tests i n  the am pi r'ie al applicati orl to th(� c ase of the Spani sh ec on om y  I 
as desc ri bed in the f ollowin g secti on , T abl" 3 s",nm aris es the 
n ull- hy poU", ses tha t wi. ll be tested, 
B ased O n  dk ta only avai lable si nc e 1969, l able 4 contai n s 
l he d"t a  ror t he evolution of l he curY'<mt" ,account balanc e ( c ol"'IIIn 2 ) .  
n et investm ent ( co lumn 3) , an d ne t in terest paYllen ts ( co luilin 4 ) ,  all 
as per'c en tages of GDp7 Fr om theSE:! varia bles the II fun dalll(m tal II 
account ba lan c e  ( c olwnn 1) i s  c on stru c t<� d, a s  def .i.l"u� d  in se cti on 3 .  
A lso indu de d  a,'., n" t .. xtem al debt ( c olumn 5) an d the com pon,m ts of 
ractor i\. .. -t he far elyn r'(�a l  I" al: e of In tero s t
6 
( c olumn 8) ,an d the 
8 rate of re al GDP gY'o wt h ( c olumn 9) . 
A s  CCln be ob sel" ved fr'om the sam ple a\l er'a ge s  in the lower 
pa,r' t of t he Ta ble, t he ave" ,' ge va lu,,' of n dU" ing 1969,,89 i s  3 ,  fj% whi I e  
the aV eY'Ol ge vOllue of y,X i s 2 , 4% ,  A s  a r esu lt, n> r*' an d, theY'ef ore, 
iI.<O .  A cc oy'din gly, on e of t he pY' erequ i si tes of t he ttl, t s propos ed by 
U am ilt on ,  FlOl vi n  an d Wick en s  w()ul d ap peay' n ot to hold, In oth.'," wonj . ,  
t he sta bi ,li l y  of dob t  seems assu,"" d f or dn y sta ble pat h of the 
"fun dam en ta l U  ba lan c e. However I sin cf! i\, i s  va r'i able the re an,� 
per i<.,> d s in whk h iI.>O suc h  dS in 1918--85 , T hi s  is w hy i t  i s  
worthwhi l0. exam in irl9 the c ha rac teri sti cs of th e processes gover'ni ng 
t he e vo lution of exter'tlii.l d(! bt cl n d  t he .. rundcunentalll account balanc e 
in acc ordan ce wi th the methodology su",," ad sed in T able 3 ,  l r. thi s 
c onn ec ti on ,  we u se l h  .. unit rout tes ts developed by D i cke y an d Fu l ler 
( 1981) i n  th.';,' exten ded v" rsi on, T he test i n vol ves es ti.m atin g by OI.S 
the r egressi on mode l 
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SOLVENCY - DYNAMIC EFRCIENCY TESTS 
Hamil ton-Flavin 
Null aO = 0 in (10) 
Hypothesis if Z
t 
- 1(0) 
Wickens 
lIb*
t 
- 1(0) 
with b*
t 
and 
Z
t 
- l(d)(d=O,l) 
and moving average 
satisfies root 
condition 
Table 3 
Wilcox 
Ft - 1(0) 
without drift 
in (29) 
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NET EXTERNAL DEBT AND FUNDAMENTAL BALANCE 
(As a % of GDP) 
Year 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Averages 
..(l.3 
1.7 
3.4 
2.5 
2.2 
-3.2 
-2.4 
-3.2 
-1.5 
2.2 
0.5 
-1.8 
-1.3 
-1.5 
0.1 
3.0 
2.9 
4.6 
3.7 
1.9 
0.6 
1969-89 0.6 
1969-73 1.9 
1974-77 -2.5 
1978-79 1.4 
1980-82 -1.5 
1983-85 2.0 
1986-89 2.6 
-1.5 
0.6 
2.1 
1.2 
0.8 
-3.2 
-2.8 
-3.6 
-2.5 
0.9 
..(l.6 
-3.0 
-3.3 
-3.2 
-2.2 
0.7 
0.9 
2.2 
0.5 
..(l.9 
-3.2 
-1.0 
0.6 
-3.0 
0.2 
-3.2 
-0.2 
-0.4 
0.9 0.3 
0.8 0.3 
1.1 0.2 
1.2 0.1 
1.4 -0.1 
0.7 -0.3 
0.4 0.0 
0.1 0.3 
0.4 0.6 
0.6 0.7 
0.6 0.5 
0.6 0.6 
0.8 1.2 
0.6 1.2 
0.9 1.3 
1.0 1.3 
1.1 0.8 
1.8 0.5 
2.7 0.5 
2.4 0.4 
3.6 0.2 
1.1 
1.1 
0.4 
0.6 
1.7 
1.0 
2.6 
0.5 
0.2 
0.1 
0.6 
1.0 
1.2 
0.4 
b" t 
12.8 
10.9 
7.1 
4.2 
1.7 
4.8 
7.1 
10.2 
11.5 
9.3 
8.9 
10.7 
12.4 
14.4 
14.7 
12.2 
9.6 
5.1 
1.3 
-0.6 
-1.2 
8.0 
7.3 
8.4 
9.1 
12.5 
12.2 
1.2 
7.8 
8.5 
7.8 
7.6 
8.8 
11.0 
10.2 
10.0 
9.7 
9.6 
10.6 
12.7 
15.2 
13.7 
10.8 
10.6 
9.6 
8.5 
7.4 
6.8 
Notes: z 
= "Fundamental· account balance (= ca + in + iteS'/PY) 
ca = Current-account balance. 
in : Total net investment. 
". " t 
5.2 
6.2 
6.8 
5.9 
7.6 
11. 1 
11.6 
8.6 
8.5 
8.1 
9.2 
11.0 
11.0 
8.6 
6.8 
5.6 
4.8 
4.2 
3.4 
3.6 
r" t 
2.5 
2.2 
0.9 
1.6 
1.1 
-0.1 
-1.3 
1.3 
1.1 
1.4 
1.3 
1.5 
3.8 
4.7 
3.7 
4.7' 
4.6 
4.1 
3.9 
3.1 
5.0 
2.4 
1.7 
0.3 
1.3 
3.3 
4.3 
4.0 
Table 4 
·t 
8.9 
4.1 
4.6 
8.0 
7.7 
5.3 
0.5 
3.3 
3.0 
1.4 
-0.1 
1.2 
-0.2 
1.2 
1.8 
1.8 
2.3 
3.3 
5.5 
S.O 
S.O 
3.5 
6.7 
3.0 
0.7 
0.7 
2.0 
4.7 
iteS = Net interest pa)fAf!nts on the external debt. Interests payed -or received- net of 
interest for direct investment inccm:!, dhidends i.nd share subscription rights and 
property. 
bt & Net external assets - Net edemal liUiilities. Net Assets .. nd Liabilities are 
obtained by subtracting fron total usets Ind liabilities the Hens relating to 
sh.lres (including direct investment), other holdings and property, and leads and 
lags in pa)'l'lfnts and collections. The figures have been adjusted for valuation 
differences (taking 1988 I.S the initial condition for consistency with the 
ba1ance-of-payments ;dentity). 
111: 
It Average rate of interest on debt. Obtained as the ratio between interest payments 
and the average annual amount of the month-end stock of external debt. 
1f 11: =- G-7 rate of inflation (external-debt-weighted) 
r'" =- (l.i*)/( 1.1(' *) 
n 
=- Rate of growth of real GOP 
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to exa",in� the rlU 11 hypothes i s fio : 'Y� against th" al teF'r.at i v .. , 
hypothesis fil : 'Y<O · in the behaviour· of a gel'll,ric variable y t '  If 
HO is r"ejected, the pr'ocess is stationary ;  if not, the pr'OCl�5S is  
only stationar'y in fi rst d Hferel'lces, i. . e. 1 (1).  In "gr·e,,".e,,t with th., 
discussion 
brackets) 
in the pr'cv ious sect tC)n the lns t  is appl lnd to .It ' bX' t 
1'he estimated p(u'O\nwt{� I" 5 cu·�! the following (t�··r'd.t.. io$· i n  
o b* t �' 2. 26 .. 0. 29  b·X·t •1 � 0. 86 0 b* t .l 
(2. 41) (2. 83) (5. 02) 
LM(4) -· 7 .. 8 
o Zt � 0 . 25 - 0. 47 2t-l 4 0 . 32 0 Zt _ ! 
( 0 . 52) (2 . 38) (2 . 50) 
LM(4) . 3 . 2  
02 b*t = ." 0 . 17 0 b*t .. -l 
(2.60) 
LM(4) - 5. 2 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
wher'" LM(4) is the LM---4th or-der autocorrelation statistic in the 
residuals, aSYlllptotically d i s tribut<>d as a chi·-squa,·ed with 'I d. f. l'he 
res iduals do not appear to have .e,·ial corr'" lation on the bas i s of 
tl;is . test . The cdUcal values of the Dickey and Full .. r tes l:s for' a 
.ample size of 20 ob.er·vation. a.r� 3. 02 at 5% (2. 65 at 10%) and 1. 96 
at 5% (1. 63 at 10%) wtmn there is or there is not a. constant in tho 
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Dlod e l  ( see Me K i nnon ( 1 990» , In v iew of ( 3 3 )  and ( 34 ) .  t h i s  cons tant 
would .. ppear 1:0 e x i s t  in the b*t proc e s s  and not so tn the Zt 
pr'oce s s ,  Whon ( 3 4 )  i s  e s t i.mated wi thout .. constant, the t-,'at io of the 
level is 2 , 85 ;  consequel'lt l y ,  on the b .. s i s  of this test the ev i.dence i s  
not c l e  .. r on b*t being a I (O) o r  I ( I )  .... wi th-driFt proces s ,  wh i l e  Zt 
i s  c l..,,,,'ly I (O) w i thout d " ift9 , S i m i l a,'ly the "v idence i s  conc l u s ive 
"ga i",t l\b* being I ( I ) , 
The pos s i b i.l. i ty of b* t being 1 ( 1. )  wou ld , however' , appear 
to be co" f i " med when the regress ion of b\ on Z
t 
is " "''' 
b*t - -0 , 26 .- 1 . 02 Zt + 1 . 02 b*t-.. l 
( 1 , 46 )  ( 2 , 59 )  ( 3 2 , 39 )  
wherE:! i t  Crtl1 bf! Se�n thC\t the coeff i c i ent of 
unity . Accord i ng l y .  the regn� s s ion sU9g e 'S t s  
speci.fication i s  
and .l:t be i ng I (O ) .  
lIb* t on CORIP" ti. b l "  
bX t·-l 
th"t 
is ve,'y close to 
the C\ppr'opridb:� 
with b*t being J ( I )  
pr()cedur� I 
A s  d i scus sed i n  the an .. lys i s  of the U"",i lton and F lav in 
$uml1laris��d in the f i r'�t col ulIln of Table 3 ,  the 
non- staUona" i ty of the non- d i scounted clebt- GOP propol"tiol'l i s  not a 
sufFic ient cond i t ion For l:he v i o lation of Lhe borr'owing consLraint. 
HOW(W�I", thp. sto.tiQflO1.r1. ty of th(� fundcum.mtal. ba.lancew··GOP prOpot" tion i s  
indot·�d ell s u f f i c hmt cond i t ion for Lho v i o la.t.ton o f  the bOI·"'row iI19 
constr'.,dnt wh<we the rat i o  debt-·GDP i s  1 ( 1 )  as would seem to happen i n  
the ""se a t  hand , Thu s ,  according to t h i s  t e . t  the transver'.a l i  ty 
cond i tion does not seem to hold , 
We .,U s t  ask how t h i s  evidence should be interp,'eted i n  a 
country which in 1989 had a net e x ternal d"bt··-GDP ratio of -1 . 2% i. e "  
was a net creditor rather than a debtor' , Evident l y ,  i t  i s  not a 
question o f  insol vency , but ,'ather the contrary , If a country i s  
i n i tial ly in a cr'ed i t  posit iol'! .\rId i s  not expec ted t o  generate 
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d�ficits of a sufficiently offsetting s ize i n  the future, i t  w i l l  not 
.at i . fy Lhe L,· .. nsver.al i ty cond i t ion e i th�r.  This can be 1 nt�r'pret"d 
as a dynamic inefficiency s i tuati.on ( see Diamond ( 1 965» wher'" the 
country ' s  penl1an��nt income fl"'om i ts rlt�t ex ter'nal assuts is greater 
than i ts pl.anned spel'ld irog . To resolve such inefficiency it could 
increase i ts present Clnd future consUlnption . 
To gather further evidence 01'1 t h i s  pos s ibi l i  ty , we pe,"forlll 
t.he te.t described 1n ( 10 )  w i Lh iI. _ 0 . 01 .  Natura l l y ,  Lh i s  t".t must 
be v i ewed with the greatest caution si.nce the aver'age sa",ple value of 
?\. i s  negative . The consequant r'egress ion i s  as fo l l ows : 
b*' t=', 2 . 68-·3 . 28 ( HiI. )t- 1 . 05 z t+o . 19 Z t._1+1 . 2 1 b*·t_1-0 . 1 8 bM t .. _2 ( 3 6 )  
( 2 . 20 ) (2 . 1 7 )  ( 4 1 . 6 ) ( 0 . 6 3 )  ( 4 . 03 )  (0 , 60 )  
Once again dO i s  marg inally s ig n i f i ccmt dnd rH�9ative,  i n  
agreement w i th Lhe dynamic ineffic iency interpretat ion . 
With r'ega,-d to the Wickens test, the fact that �b'\ i s  
I(O) seems to sa.t i s fy the neceSSd.ry �nd sufficitmt cond i tion ror 
sati.sfying the solvency constr'aint according to ( 25 ) ,  though Z t 
being I(O) .""ms to contr'ad ict ( 26 ) . A pos s ible explanation i s  th .. t 
with a sl1la l l  value of iI., i t  may be d ifficult to d i stinguish the 1 ( 1 )  
proc<!ss w i th d ri rt in (26) f, .,m <In I (O) process without d r i f t lO , 
Howevel� we reitera.te that a nec;essar'y cond i t i.on for this analy s i s  i s  
lh .. t iI.>O . 
Lastly , the r'e s u l ts of the Wi lcox test ar'e g i v"" , T h i s  
cons i . ts o f  ,,. .. ,.ining lhe stationarity o f  the d i s counted value o f  
exter'nal debt i n  pr'oportion t o  GOP, in accordance wi ttl the analy. i s i n  
( 3 1 ) , 'fhe f i " s t  co lulIln o f  Tabl e  5 includes lhe series o f  d i scount 
factor's obtai"ed from Table 4 .  lhe d i scount factor for 1969 i .  
norma l i .<ld to unity , The .ecolld column o f  Tabl e  5 g i ves this 
d i scou"ted value , which i s  obtained by mul t iply ing the values of b� in 
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lable 4 by th" r'elat"d factors in Table 5 .  As the values of iI. ar'e 
nega t i ve in mos t  cases, the d i scoun ted value of th .. debt s la"ds higher' 
than the rIOn- d i s counted value . 
As shown in Figure 2., regard l e s s  of the measure chosenl a 
s im i lar Pclth i s  obser'vabl e :  a fa l l  from 1969 to 1973 ; <in explo s i ve 
increase frolll 1974 to 1 983 with a turr';.ng point i n  1979 p" obably due 
to the �ff .. cts of the "d<!valuation cum stabi l i 7.ation" po l icy package 
of mid···1977; and an explosive d"cn,ase s i nce 1993 as a re s u lt of the 
improv""1ont in the cur ... ent· ... ccount balance up to 1986 and of the shar'p 
increase of net for'e igl'l invest.,ent after that year . It i s  t h i s  fal l  i n  
the e x ternal net d"bt that lhe previous te s ts appear to be capturing . 
1h" fol lowi"g r'egression provides formal evideroee on the 
statiorlarity of Ft ' in aceo,·d .. nce w i th the thi r-d column o f  Table 3 :  
11 Ft = 2 . 52 - 0 . 24 Ft.-l -+ 0 . 86 11 F t -l 
( 2 . 1 4 )  ( 2 . 57 )  ( 4 . 78 )  
LM( 4 )  " 2 . 0  
( 3 7 )  
In the l ight o f  ( 3 7 ) , the evidence seems s illli lar t o  that 
obtai nnd in ( 3 3 ) ,  i . e .  the seri"s i s  1 ( 1 )  possibly w i th d r i ft . 
Howevel" , as il"l the previous case, the sl1Ia l l  sample s ize auai-Iabla Rlay 
hinder lhe d i st i nction betw""n t h i s  proc<!ss and a 1(0) process without 
dri f l .  Thus the tentati ve cone Ius ion i s  that no solvency proble",s 
e x i st in Spain but qu i te the contrary . 
To examine the r'obus 'lnes s of this conc l u s ion to thE.� 
assumption o f  relative PI'P impl i d t  in the construction of fac tor iI. 
in ( 5 ) ,  a new exter'nal debt and factors series based on ( 6 )  was 
computed wi thvl.l t impos ing the aforementioned as sumption . The 
correspond ing regre s s ion i n  d i scounted values i s  as fol lows : 
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DISCOUNT FACTORS AND DISCOUNTED DEBT/GDP RATIO 
Year qt Ft 
1969 1.000 12.8 
1970 1.062 11.6 
1971 1.080 7.7 
1972 1.118 4.7 
1973 1. 187 2.0 
1974 1.263 6.1 
1975 1.331 9.5 
1976 1.357 13.8 
1977 1.382 15.9 
1918 1.406 13.1 
1919 1.406 12.5 
1980 1.406 14.8 
1981 1.378 17.0 
1982 1.320 19.0 
1983 1.270 18.7 
1984 1.243 15.2 
1985 1.206 11.6 
1986 ·1.178 6.8 
1981 1. 166 1.5 
1988 1.182 -0.7 
1989 1.202 -1.4 
qt: discount factor defined in expression (25) of the 
text. 
Ft: discounted value of net external debt defined in 
expression (27) of the text. 
Table 5 
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NET DEBT AND FUNDAMENTAL BALANCE 
lAs a % of GDP) 
Figure 2 
" r------------------------------------------------------------------------, " 
" 
" 
" 
':. 
Stabilization Policy I 
(1977: IH) 
Stabilization Policy II 
(1982: IV) 
F 
" 
" 
" 
' ...... ,' 0 
(0) 
111. 10 71 72. 73 74 75 7. 77 7. 7. 80 81 82: 83 84 85 al 87 II 8. 
b*: net external debt 
z : 'fundamental' balance 
F : discounted net external debt 
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4 Ft = 2 . 79 - 0 . 30 Ft-l 4 0. 81 4 Ft-l 
( 2 . 23 )  (2 . 70) (4. 56) 
LM(4) = 2 . 2  
(38 ) 
In the v i ew of ( 3 8 ) ,  the conclus ions seem simi lar' to those 
reached above : the Spanish economy is p"r·rectly solv"rlt now .. nd i t  is 
not l i kely to hlive solverlcy pr'oblems in the futur'., . l ndeed , if 
Clny thing, on� cou Id say tha.t there ar'Q some dynclmic in9ff ic i (mc iQ$ 
that are to be r· .. moved, although this is not certain g i ven that the 
values of the t .. -ratios ar'Q not suffic iently d i scr'lminati ng g i \wn thu 
reduced sample s iz" . 
In spite of these seemingly favour'abl e  conclusions" this 
should not l .. "d anyone i n to thinking tholt pres"nt output growth 0I1'1d 
con'pet i,tiveness tr'ends can conti.nue without endangev'ing Ul(� fulfi lment 
of the external constraint in the Spani sh ecorlOmy . Thi s  is so b�cause 
the most reliabl., eeonometr'ie tests performed so far test for' th" 
ex te,'nal solvency of the economy giv,!.!l the po l icy rules fol lowed by 
the authorities i"  the Plist d ir'ected towards avoiding d"bt 
explossions . In fact, Section 2 of the papur sU<Jges t(ld lh .• t pa.t 
Spanish macroecorlomi.c pol icy r'eacted so as to avoiding s I tuations 
where the n"t exter'nal d"bt as a percent of GOP would gl"ow beyond w�"'t 
was con. ide red to b" Ii reasonable leve 1 .  Therefor' .. , if po Hcy 
continues b"hav i llg thi s  way there w i l l  be no future insolvency 
problellis i" the Span i sh econolllY .  
However', this i s  far fr'om making the pr'esent s I tuation an 
ideal one , givon the evident ovedmating of an economy whIch has been 
growing at an Olver'agE! rate c lose to 5% s ince 1986, and whose 
inter'national cOlllpe t.itivem�ss has deteriorated by 24% s ince thclt year. 
It clin be argued that Spain ' s  present formal committlnent to py·e.ey·ving 
exchange·-rate stabi l i ty ins ide LhE!! [urope.:tn Monetary Sy'S L(�m and its 
internationally high lo"g a"d short-,ternl intel"est rates (shown in 
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Figure 3 )  ar'e attr'acti ng consider'able capi tal- flow s ,  and therefor .. 
thdt dr·a.tic policy corrections like those in the past are no long(!r 
needed. Contr'a,-y to thi s ,  as stated ir, Vi;:;als ( 1 990a , b) this relaxed 
a t tilude lIIay h�.ad over lilllC! 1.;0 a �ev�re loss in competitiveness that 
by substant ially reducing the rate of retur'n ear'ned by for'eign direct 
dnd por·tfolio invQstors, luay c.ause a dry·-up in n!-!t forel(3n investment 
at a time when the curr.",t accoUl" t deficit gets larger , 
If su�h a situation is allowed to happon then it would not 
be u"thinkable that the increased risk-·pr·emiu," on the Spanish economy 
will p,"ecipiLdte a ",assive outflow of shor't .. -r'un capital, thus forcing 
the authorities to tdke tr'aumatic stabilization policy measures as in 
past epi sodes ,  If this is done as in the past, as our estimat"d 
reduced-··form equations indicate, then the Spanish economy will not 
&!!.com.!L.i n so.Il!.!1.nh..Jiowe�-,- thlLill't _�.!!£.i,�L'!.!)£.J!£2.!lOmJ.L.co s t L .. 2.L .. act iDs 
lu st _ .. at J: .. he J�..'lfL�.at .. her than at_.the begin_'lli:l9...... .QLthe .l'!!:9c�ss may .. be. 
!!1lde.�i rab.IL�£'-!:!!!!lill!!!.�ri U ... la,rJiI.!! . 
In sum, g iv<m the high sensitivity of financial and for'ei9" 
"X change markets to the evolution of vadables like competitiveness 
and the exter'n&l accoul'lts it. i s  desir'able that the government pur'sues 
Lhe in ternal goal of non ·�inflationary growth, and clt the same timQ 
ensut�es that this is not endarlger'e d I'IOW arId in the futu r(� by 
unfavour'able developments in the ",ter'nal accounts, especially with 
regard to the role of forei.gn investm(mt which has been so important 
in balancing the exter'nal accoun ts in the recent p"st. Th" next 
section explores what kind of policy guidelines can be establi.shed so 
th"t boLh inter'nal and ex ternal "qui librium can be simultaneously 
achieved in Spain  in the' future. 
Based on the analysis of the for'noer' sections, a sinople rule 
that a country could follow to satisfy the , .. ternal constr'aint would 
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be to run. on average, the "fundamenlal ll balance that i s  consi stent 
with the cho�){m I'\t�t extet'nal d(�bt·-GOP r'at.io ( i . e .  which is  
sustainable ) , Undoubted l y ,  what the appropiate s ize of  such a balanc� 
should be in practice w i l l  deptmd on lhe net external d��bt·-GDP ratio 
speclfical ly chosen a. wel l  as 01'1 the futur'., path of r,.,al inter'est and 
output growth r'at�. , 
Ev idently , decid ing what i .  the socially optimal d"bt l"vel 
l:owa,"ds  whh:h the ecorwmy should convel'ge in long····"'un equi l ibr" ium is 
not an easy ta.s k .  However', then:� may b(� a s impler' critel" iorl based on 
the .. ffect U,,,,t exte""al d"bt leve l. have on the ratings uf tha 
countr'y i n  international financial markets and , consequentl y ,  01'1 the 
c.ountry··,·ri sk pr(�mium chay'gad when boY-rowing inter'nationa.lly . 
Therefor'e W(� assume il'l what fol lows that the Spanish 
economy wi. l l  al'pr'oa�h a net "xternal debt,-GDP ratio which is  
cOrlsi stent with the highest rating , anel thus with the lowest cost of 
bor-rowing . Of course , this  is a necessary but rlot a sufficient 
condi tion for' the highest raUrlg to be obtained s i.nce there are 
sever'al oUh�r economic and non····econolll ic  cr'iter.ia used in calculating 
ratings . 
In pr'actice, it  turns out to be the Ccisa that U", net 
ex bu'flal d��bt·-GOP r'at io con s i stent with the above cost"-minimiz l l'lg 
strategy I"anges from values c lose to zero to ncgOl.tj ue valuE�s -·that i s ,  
the counlry being a nQt cred i tor , Neuer'the les s ,  to s i mp l: i  fy the 
ca.lculation. as much as possibl  .. , we assume that in the Spanish CNS,", 
thi s  va.lue can taken to be zero , Consequent l y ,  our anal y s i s  should be 
1 1  viewed a s  em eXdlnple r'Qt.:her than a s  a general ca.'sa 
Our assumption, whi le justi.fiable on pr'actical ground s ,  
also ha.s the advantage .of mak ing the results unconcl ; tional upon the 
futur'e -unknowrl·'· path fol lowed both by real inter'est rates anel , to 
certa;n extent, by the growth " '<lte of the economy , This  i s  so because 
as i ,,,:licated by expression (7): 
r)f - n z - _ .. "-- b* 1 + n 
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whan the spec ific value of exter'nal Mt d"bt (b*) i s  zero, a spec ific 
aver"ge " fund"mental" bah",ce (z)  which is  consi stent with fulfil ling 
the exte " nal constraint i s  also zero 12 . 
Of cou,·.e, the above simple rule for achieving external. 
��qui l ibrium is not the only one s ince a.s indicat,�d in sect ion 3 when 
the " eal g" owth ,'ate of the eco""my exceeds the ,·eal. interest ,'ate on 
the extemal d .. bt any " table path of the " fund .... ent .. l" balance (z) 
wi l l  stab i l i z.e the level of net exte .... 'al · debt a"ound the chosen 
s t"adY'-s tate valu e .  Neve,·thel ... s ,  our policy rule has the v i rtues of 
simpli city and of few i nformational. requi rement s .  
In sum, .. policy of ",aintaining an �9g balance for the 
II fundamental "  account approx imately equal to zero dUY'ing long per'iods 
of ti,ne is consi stent both with the exploitation by lhe Spanish 
economy of the intertelllporal and intergene,"'ational t " ade opportuni tie. 
th"t openness makes available whi l e  at the same time obey ing the 
long-ny'un exteY'nal constraint.  In other word s .  whi le the IIfundamcntal li 
balance Cd.n be d i ffer'er,t fl"om zero at any g i vl;!n ye(:lr, on aver'age it 
must be ze,·o over a period of many yea,·s . 
Furthermore, when a country Y'uns a series of II fundamentalll 
bala"ce defi c i ts , the alJthorities should " "cognise that a ...  ,des of 
" fundamental" balance su'·plu.<!s must be ran i n  the future. If there 
are r,o spec ific market mechani sms bl" ing i ng out theses surplus(!s then 
adequate policy actillns should be impl" mented on a tim<>ly fashion to 
avoid las t-·n,inute t,· .. umatic pol icy cha"ges .  
In corm"ctioll to the above , the evolution of net exte'· .... l 
debt and the fundamelltal bala"ce of the Span i sh economy a. shown i" 
Figur'" 2 is very info,'",ative . As c lea" ly seen in the Figure , maj or 
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-and economic .. l ly and soc ially cost ly_· stabi l i  .... tion poli c i es we,"" 
implemenlud whenever ther'Q was a series of u fundamenb� lll  account 
deficits le .. d i ng to an exces s i ve net e xtern .. l debt bui ld" .. ·up" Besid" s ,  
look ing .. t the p,"esent evolution o f  the " fundament .. l "  balance i t  i s  
also ev ident that, i n  spite o f  the impr'e s s i v e  foreign investment boom 
of recent year's , the corltinuous widening of the Sparl i�h curr'�rlt 
account deficit h .. s led to a g r  .. du .. l ,"eduction i n  the " fundamental "  
account sur'plus , which i s  now approach i ng .r.ero . 
It i s  our bel ief that thi.s shrink ing " fundamenta l "  surplus 
is the u l timate reason why the Spanish econom ic cluthol" i t i,�s dr-a 
becoming inc," .. asi.ngly wor'''ied nowadays about the evo lution of the 
curT""t account , and why the s i n'pJ.e "xternal equ i li brium ind icator 
based on a zero I1fundOlmental U  balance pr'esented in th i s  sectiorl may bE! 
t3 
useful " 
However, i f  we wish the po l i cy guide l i nes to be fu l ly 
operationa.l i t  is not enough to sa.y that an aver'age IIful1dam(omtal "  
account balance o f  ""r"o should b<' obta i ned . I t  i s  a l so neces sa,"y to 
make sure th"t th i s  .!ll!ter:!,al--l!9.!!j.J ibr�.!!"!l s i tuation is a l so fu l ly 
consi.stent with l!)ternal" bal� -·non-· inflationary sustained g ,·owth-· 
and , moreover, th«t:. the authori t Ies can relate these guals to policy 
ins tt'·uments . 
For th i s  reason, we est imate a very simple equation for the 
" funddmentalll accour,t balance ,  us irl9 as explanator'y variablGs lhose 
variables which could be considered as the main arguments of its 
d if Fererlt compon�"ts dome s l i c  ,,, d foreign GOP growth ,"ate s ,  "'rl ind"x 
of compet i t i vene s s ,  a real interest rate d i ffer"ential and the degree 
of opennes s  of the economy " The e s t imated equation i s  the fol lowing : 
2t �, -'() " 2 8  
( 1 .  8 )  
_. 0 . 62 ( Y t- ,Yt) + 1 . 01 (y·*t-Y·*t) -" 15 ,, 18 
( 4 . 4 ) ( 7 . 5) ( 6 ,, 6 )  
se _ 0 . 82')"., R2 "' 0 . 8 8 ,  OW :.o 2 ,, 43 
S t of 0 " 12,,, +0 . 10 (r�r*) ( 3 9 )  
( 2 . 1 ) ( 2 . 2 )  
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where z i. s the level of the II fundcullentalli balancE! as propoy,tion of 
tnmd GOP ; (y._y) i s  the d i fference between the le")s of actual and 
trend domestic r�al GOP; (Y*_Y'K ) i s  the d i.ff�,'enc� between the logs 
actual and tr'�nd for'�ign r'e .. l GDp1 4 , ., is an indi catot- of the 
degree of openness calcu lated as Lhe sum of real impor·ts and expor'ts 
over' tr'end r,� .. l Sp .. nish GDP; and ( r'-rK") i s  the d i ffe,'enU .. l between 
domestic and internatiorlal ex-post long-teY'm real interest rate$ . 
As can be observed i n  equation (39) , i n  spite of some signs 
of over .. -fi tt ing w i th such a sma l l  .ample s ize,  all the coe Fficients 
are s igni.fi cant and the i r  signs are i n  accordance with theory : 
excess ive domestic growth h�c'.ds to a worsening of the IIfundamental" 
balance whi l e  excessive forei.gn growth, and a real exchange ,'ate 
depreciation (0 going down up) l" .• d to .. n improvem""t . The real 
long- te,'" interest ,'ate d ifferential also se"ms to point out in the 
rigth d i r'eeti()n, part ially captu" ing the for'eign inve. tment boom, The 
est i,.at�d equal ion aJ so indicates that as the Spanish econo.,y has 
beco,"e increasingly more op<!n over the yea,'s th is has led to an 
improvement i l'l the I Ifundamentalll account balance, thev'efoY'Q expl i c i tly 
re j ect ing the fear's ()f those who c laim th .. t the ex tarnal 
l i berCll iz.ation of the e conomy nece ssarily 9Emerates external account 
1 5  problen.s 
Equ"t ion (39)  can be inverted to find out wh"t was the 
d i fference between the actual path arid the equ i l i brium path of the 
real. ""ch,,nge rate which would have been cons i stent over the period 
1969-89 w i th the maintenance of a balanced fundamental account ( z",() 
in a context of internal equ i li. brium -with output growing at the i r  
trend "ates both in Spain clnd abroad- .. nd equa l i ty o f  " "al interest 
16  
rates 
Figure 4 shows the evohltion of the "real exchange rate 
gap" in the Spanish economy , obtained according to the above --dese" ibed 
procedure , during the 1969-·89 period . Evidently,  whi l e  i t  could b" 
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claimed that the exerci S� violCltes Lucas I cf'i tique W{� wOlnt to ar'9U{.� 
that there dy'e sev�ral n�asons why it  nevet'theless n�mains usefu l :  
F i rst,  Figur'e 4 shows that over' thE:! pE�riod ther'e helVe betH) 
sQv�r'al Hpi sodes characbari.t.(!d by sever'e clild long,,,· las t l ng 
overvaluatiorlS of the peseta in reed terllls . Second I i f W(� compan� 
Figure 2 and 4 
and 1979· .. 1982) 
it  so hclpp<!ns thclt in each of th".e episod9s ( 1973-1911 
t.here has b(.�en C\ lUarked dE!ter'iorOl.tion of thE:� 
U fund<:llllontal" balancG and a Y'd.pid bu i Id-up of nt!t ex tar'na! debt . 
Third, i.t suggests that to a l'''·ge extent the r·"tent f·e .. l appr·ec i  .. U.on 
uf the pes��ta. in reC(Hlt years ( sne Figure �; ) ha.s b{�'�n cl.n equi l ibr'ium 
ph(mOrnenOfl, and that no c lear dovaluation i s  ca.l led for (even if such 
a measu('e where effective nowadays which is highly doubtfu l ,  g l \1(m Lhe 
high Itde facto" degY'E:!(� of wage indexati.on in Spain) ° 1 h i s  evolution 
senms to sU9gHSt 1..:hdt the reClu,t rt�al appreci.a.tion of  the pes(! \:a mc1.Y 
have been dr·iven by the large inflow of foreign capit .. l ,  which,  i n  a 
Icu"9Q proportion, w(�nt irlto financing dir'ect investment in the Spa.ni sh 
industr·y , implying strong gains in  labour· producti v i ty in that sector' , 
These large capital inflows have b�wn attroactt!d in pctrot by rHiil 
inter'est rate d iffer·ential s ,  but when these d i.ffer·entials d i ssOlp"ar·, 
doS in the" s imulation exer'c i s e ,  Lhe Hqui l ibrium real apprec iation of 
the pesete\ r'emairls to a largE:! extent , which can b(� inter'pY"et('!d in th(� 
sens" that it  is  mainly the opening··-up of the Spanish "' .  rk�t to th" 
rest  of the EEC that tr·igger·ed thi. s  equi. l i bdUlIJ pheno",,,,.,on . And 
four'th , it sugges ts that great "ttm,tiorl should be payod to avoiding 
further· real appreciations of the peseta -·that i s ,  
deterior'ations in inter'national competi  t i  veness·- Lhclt ma.y j eupar'ad 1./.9 
achieving non-· inflat ioru�.ry sustained growth in th(� futur'e bocaus'=! of 
external d i fficu lties . As observnd in the last two years in Figur'e 4 , 
there ar'e some s igns of over-··appreciation of the peseta in  rea.l terms 
which suggest thclt its str'eng thenil1g ",ay have gone too far and "'clY 
need some ad j ustment of economic fundamenta.l s  i n  the future in order 
to avoid a s ignificcmt loss of compe"titiverless of Span ish expur'l 
industries1 7 , 
" 
" 
" 
u, 
(10) 
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Figure 4 
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line indicate an overvaluation of the real exchange rate; ie, an insufficiently 
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Figure 5 
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10 complete the ntacroecononlic  picture, Figure 6 repr'esents 
the estimat"d evolut ion of the " ,'eal output gdP" in the Spanish 
economy , as measur'ed by the percentage d ifference between actual and 
tr(md GOP ( F igure 7) , As can be seen, thure dr'e two periods of 
significant ove,'heating of the economy i n  1 976-,80 and 1987-89 which 
again broad ly coincide w i th the periods where Spanish authoriti't'll' have 
voiced mor'e loudly the i "  conce" l'Is about getting into a messy situation 
char'de teri.lQd by both internal and external d i sequi l ibria, 
Furthermo,'e , g iven thdt the real exchange ,'ate of the pesetd tends to 
dppr'ec i.d.te I ceteri.!.. . . .J!!.� I whenever there is excess domestic dt�mand , 
this shows that i"terT,al and exter'"al d i sequi l i bria are nothJng but 
the two s ides of the sa.me macroeconomic coin . 
Consequently,  i f  an excessive apprec iatiol'l of the pesetd i s  
to be avoided in  the future, it  i s  necessary tha,t' , the presm,t "real 
output g"p" be e l intindted i" a permanent way by u s i ng demdnd pol icies 
designed to l1Iode" dte demand growth, and structural ' supply pol ic ies 
des igl'led to i.,prove potential output growth , Moreover, a more 
s ignificdnt contribution of fi scal restraint i s  needed on the demand 
side s ince moneta,'y policy w i l l  not be effective i n  permanently 
dffecting real va" iabl"s l ike real outpu t, the "fundamental" balance 
or the real excha"ge rate , Monetary policy should rather be oriented 
towar'ds guar'antee ing price and nominal excharlge r'<:\te stabi. l i ty ,  
specially gi ven the expected timetable for the mo"eta,'y integration 
process in the Eu,'opean Community , 
F i nal ly,  a s imple but i l lustr'ative .,xcerc i se could be done 
in ta,'ons of estab l i shing a ta,'g"t level for the net asset accumulation 
by the private sector (NAp) which would be corosi stent with the desired 
level s  o f  the corresponding t1et asset accumulation by the public  
sector (NAg) and the "fundamental"  cU''re"t account balance chosen to 
slabi I i.!e the proportiuns of domestic and foreign debt i n  tel"ms of 
GDP , Figure 8 shows the recent evolution of both borrowing 
requi rements , together w i th an adjusted measure of NAp which w i l l  be 
defined below, 
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To addr'ess  this i s su�,  use i s  mCld(� of the wel l  known open 
economy id�mti ty 
CA _ NAp + NAg (40) 
which is converted i nto the Il fundamentalll accourlt balance by cl.uding 
exter'nal d(�bt- interest paymE.mts and long-·term net investment to CA and 
NAp, as in ( 4 ' ) ,  giv ing rise to the transformed ident.lly 
Z _.. ANAp -f NAg 
where ANAp (,= NAp + 1\_1 et 
nt�t assQt acclimu ldtion by 
percentage of GOP we obtain 
B\_.1 + INt ) 
the private 
( 4 1 )  
r'epreSQnts the "ad j usb!d" 
sector. [xp" (!ss ing ( 4 1 )  a 
z _ a + f (42) 
whare now a .= ANAp/py and f =  NAg/py . Then, it  i s  wi 11 krlOwn r"" m the 
ad thmetic of the gove" nnlent inter·tempo,·al budget const"aint ( se" 
Hami l ton and F lav 1n ( 1986» th"t thore :;, ., a long ·-run connect ion 
between the net a"set accumulation by the public secto,' and the leve l s  
o f  gov''' m'''lt debt and high-power money (al l a s  a proportion o f  GOP) ,  
given by 
!L±-n" h 
1+1l'+n (43 ) 
wherl! express ion (43)  indicates that in the long .. -run, a budget defi c i t  
(f<O) i s  ultimat<!ly financed by the inflation tax collected by the 
gove,'ment f,'om the ho Ide,'s of i ts l iabi l  i ties,  name ly debt (b) and 
high-·powered money (h) . Now, substituting ( 7 )  and (43 ) i nto (42 ) ,  i t  
i s  possible to obtain the long-run ta"g<!t level of the ad justed nat 
asset accumulation by the private sector, gi ven by : 
'Mo(lDP 
" 
" 
. , 
." 
18" 70 
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_ r.*-n. b* - r-n b + lL±.J:!. h 1+n 1+n 1-l1fTn ( 44) 
Tabln 6 contairl' 'lOlDe tarltative calculations of values of a 
cons i .tent with d l.fferenl v"lues of bK , includ ing the pr'ev i.ous ly used 
value b*=O . The ugoldan rulell a.s sumption r ·.:n has benn made for 
. inlplicity as we l l  as in oriler to avoid th" a lway s d ifficu l t  task of 
IIlP.asuring public sector debt . The value of h (=20 . 8  pp) co,-responds to 
the end of 1989 money base/GOP propor'tion . lhe result. in the Table 
.how th"t Financial equ i l i br'.illlD in Spain requ i re s ,  in the long-run, 
avel .... g" v .. lues of a ranging fronl 1. pp to 2 , 5  pp . depending on the 
values taken by r'*, n "'rid 11' ,  Giv<!n that the unad j u s t"d "nd ad j u s ted 
values of a in 1989 are 0 , 0  pp and 3 , 8  pp respecti. vely , the obtained 
tar'get values seHm to point out th"t the cur-r"nt dec l i ne .uffer'"d by 
Spani sh net asset accumu laUol" by the pr'; vate sector ; s sti 1 1  wi thin 
the equ i l ibr'ium bounds defitted by the previous calculations, unless 
fore i.grl inve s tment suffer's a sever'e d t�yM·· UP . If� for instan(;E:!1  the sum 
of n"t foreign inves tlD'H1t plus . interest paynlents takes i ts salDple 
value of 1 . 6  pp, this means that, in the w"r'st pos s i ble s i tu .. Uon in 
Table 6 ,  the target value of a should be around 1pp .  Accord ing l y ,  
gi ven that the goverlllN,t borrowing requi r'elllent has fallen s i nce 1987 
<lnd presulDably wi. l l  continue to fall in the future, th" present 
worsenirl9 of the current Cl<.:count can be v i ewed as the outcome of the 
dec i s ion of the prillate sector which finds <lppropi<lte to inv" o t  beyond 
its means irl t{�nns of sav i ng capac ity . Thu s ,  even i f  no rad ical 
measur'�s s��om neces sClr'y in the present s i tuation, it Illay be sens ible 
that "'''pha s i s  should be placed on policy .. "asur-es which pr'omote 
private and public saving " ather than on those reotr'ain ing inves tlDent, 
so as to avoid problem"s from the external si.de , 
This paper explored the conceptual n"ture of the "xten, .. l 
constr'aint and its practical r"levance for the Span ish econolDY . The 
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Table 6 
TARGETS FOR ADJUSTED NET ACQUISITION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
(As a % of GDP) 
r • n = 2 r • n = 4 
.. � 3 11' = 6 .. = 8 .. = 3 .. = 6 .. = 8 
r* = 2 . 0  1 . 0  1 . 5  1 . 9  1 . 4  1 . 9  2 . 2  
b* = 0 
r* = 6 . 0 1 . 0  1 . 5  1 . 9  1 . 4  1 . 9  2 . 2  
r* = 2 . 0  1 . 0  1 . 5  1 . 9  1 . 3  1 . 8  2 . 1  
b* = 5 
r* 6 . 0  1 . 2  1 . 7  2 . 3  1 . 4  2 . 0  2 . 3  
r* • 2 . 0  1 . 0  1 . 5  1 . 9  1 . 2  1 . 7  2 .0 
b* = 10 
r* = 6 . 0  1 . 4  1 . 9  2 . 3  1 . 6  2 . 1  2 . 4  
Note: see expression (44) in the . text . 
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paper has shown that whi le the t,'ue exter'nal constraint of the economy 
.1. ') a long-,"un one in Lhe absence of d i s  tor'thlns clod market 
imper'fections , i t n{.�ver·theless may b(.� rat ional for' gover'nmcnts to 
nloni Lor Lhe shor'ler-t'un evolution of the ex tar'na1 accounts for the 
purpose of avoid i l1g futut"e d i  ffiewl tie s .  Mor€:!:over', whenever' such 
d i s tor·tions dnd ill'per'fections clre important, governments JIlay O\I�n be 
justi fied in setting specific short-.. run exter'nal. targets , 
Regarding Lhe spec ific Cdse o f  the Spanish economy , we have 
shown that h�r' economic pey'fonnance over' the IN.st twenty year's offer's 
cl (�a.r dl'ld unambiguous examples o'F major' policy changes baing pr" omptod 
by unravout"able exter'nal accounts deve lopments . In PblF'ticu lar. Span). sh 
economic authoY'i tles of v� .. 'y d i ffer·(·mt po li t i.cdl persua.sioflS have 
procE:!eded to adopt tr�aumO\tic but nE:!ver'th�less necessary mOlcr'oecol'lc,mic: 
policy m��asur'es in the past to avoid an exploss lon of  the n�t Qxter'nal 
debt-·GDP ratio , 
The various coi.ntegration tests carried out in the pap�r' 
sug9�!�t .thC\t the Spanish ecorlOIllY i s  at pres�mt fd.r fr't)m facing H.ny 
. problems d.,rived f,'om the fulfilment of the external solvency 
constraitlt . Neverthe les s ,  this dOGS nt)t mean thi:\t a relaxnd ur 
complacent attitude should b(. take" r·"gard ing the futu,·e evolution of 
internd.tional competitiveness I espec ially g ivGn the e1 iminatlon of 
capital cOI" trols  in Spain by 1993 , Indeed, we advocate fu,·th"r' fisl,al 
restr·d.int and supply-side � l:,.uctural pol ic ies . 
lo help establ ish a simpl... set 
consistent w i th both internal and external 
proposed tar-geting the evolution of what we 
of poli.cy guid,=! l inf.�s 
equi l ibrium, we have 
howe dE!fin"'.d Ci!i the 
"funddmentalll accourlt balance to be zero on aver'age over long .. �periods 
of time , We havl> also provided tentative cal cul.ations of thr'e" 
variables : the Ureal exchange r'a.i:e gap II and U real output 9d.p" and a 
Ittargetll for the private sector ' s net acqu i s ition of financial assets . 
These c"n be used by the authorities in the future as an app,'oximate 
indiciitor of inter'nal. and external d i. sequi l ibria, and as a useful tool 
for designing suitable macroeconomic pol icie s .  
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1 .  [arlior detail"d descriptions of the bas ic  forces underl y i ng the 
ext"Y'rIi>ll performanc" of the Spani sh economy can b.. found in De la 
Dehesa ( 1983 ) ,  and Vinals ( 1983 ) . A good overview of the current 
situation can be found in Ferl'lande;t ( 1 990) . 
2 .  For an analys i s  of the microeconomic and macroeconomic eff(�cts of 
Spain ' s  entr'y to the ETC see Vinals et aI . ( 1990c) . Fer·"" "dez. .. rod 
S"ba.ti"n ( 1990) test  if Spain ' s  accession to' the FEC has h",d .. n 
impact on tr .. de flows . 
3 .  A rise in e i s  interpreted as an appreciation . 
4 .  We are .. bstr· .. ctin9 fr'on, hysteresi,s-·related effects . 
5 .  Wi lcox ( 1989) provides several examples of this possibi l i ty .  
6 .  Al though it; i .  arguable that the authoritie s '  reaction function 
reponds to th", "fundamental" balance account insteAd of to the 
trade balance account, the steady character' of net foreign 
inves tmHnt makGs it easy to for'ecast, and therefore we bel ieve 
that at least, in the case of th" Spanish �(:"no",y , this i s  a 
fairly reasonable assumption . 
7 .  Cash-· flow data has been us"d which i s  only available s i nce 1969 . 
8 .  It shou ld be borne in mind ,  however, that if' the interest rates 
for exter"al assets and l iabi l it i"s d i.ffer, changes i" assets and 
l iabi l i ties tll"t leava the le"el of net external d"bt unal tared 
may change th" average cost of net external debt . Assets and 
l iabi l ities are assumed to be homogeneous i n  the tex t .  
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9 .  It i s  impo,·t"",t to test that there i s  no constant und",' the nul l  
hypothes i s  of the exist.mc" of a uflit root . Were Uwt"e to be such 
a constant, the appropriate cd tical values would be those of the 
s tandardi sed norma l ,  .. .  g .  1 . 96% dt 5% level ( .ne Dolado .. t a 1 .  
( 1990 ) )  . I n  a l l  cases studied, the constant was not 5 i g  ... i ficant 
under the nu 1 1 .  
10 .  That i s  i f  i\. ",0, (26) would be s i.mi lar to Z t""et whi l� 
I\h\ i s  sti l l  gover'ned by (25) . 
1 1 .  The cur"ent Moody ' s  rating of Spai.n ' s  foreign debt pos ition i s  An 
minu s ,  sti l l  th"ee steps b"low the ,.aximum " ating of AnA . In this. 
sense the .. ssumption that b* should be 2""0 in  the long· .. ·'·un does 
not seem too restrictive . 
1 2 .  Howeve,' from a historical perspective, the sustai.notbil ity of 
defic i t. recordod in v .. rious sub-periods could b.. " oughly 
calculated us i"9 expression (7) . Thus , fo,' exa .. ple, usin9 the 
sample averages of th" lower p,,,·t of Table 2, i f  i t  had be,,,, 
wished to ... dntaln in the 1974·· 1977 pe" iod the ave"age propor·tion 
of d"ht of th" pf'Ovious .ub·'period ( 7 . 3%) , the d". lgned 
fund .... ental bal .. "ce would have been - 0 . 20% of GOP . As the .. ctual 
proport ion wa.s , on a.verage, -2 . S%, Thi s  incl icab�s 
non-·sustainabil i ty in that .ub-·period . On .i .. i lar grounds ,  the 
1980-1982 .ub-period doe. not sat i s Fy either the solvency 
constr.ai.nt whe,·ea. the 1986- 1989 period does so co .. fodably .  
13 . For example, the sustainab i l i ty of external deficit.  i s  oft"n 
.. ssessed in terlll' of alternative definiti.ons of the basi. e balanc e .  
S"e . Ortega e t  .. 1 .  ( 1989) for an analys i s  o f  CU'T,.mt account 
pos itions sustainab i l i ty in the EEC using a definition of the 
bas ic balaru:e which i s  identical to the IIfundamental "  account 
balance used i.n the p"esent paper.  
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14 , Foreig", GOP gr'owth r'efer's to G- 7 countries and has been obtained 
us ing the same weights as to compute rl+ .... r l ier on , Trend GOP 
g" owth rates have been obtai.ned thr'ough spl i nes i n  1974 and 1985 , 
1 5 ,  For an analys i s  of the effects of openness  on the Spanish economy 
after 1986 see Viria I s  et al , ( 1 990c) , 
1 6 ,  Unl ike in other analy.es of  fund"llIental "qui librium exchange 
rates ,  the str"uctur'al component of foreign capital flows i s  not 
assulll<!d but estimated , Soe , for "xample,  Wi l l iamson ( 1985) and 
Barrel and Wre,',--Lew i s  ( 1989) , 
1 7 ,  De Grauwe ( 1990) makes a s imi lar point i n  trying to identify 
poss ible causes of the real appreciations in the curr'endes of the 
Souther'n countries in the EEC , 
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